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Summary
Objectives: To examine the experiences of clinical and
managerial leaders in the English healthcare system charged
with implementing policy goals of openness, particularly in
relation to improving employee voice.
Design: Semi-structured qualitative interviews.
Setting: National Health Service, regulatory and third-
sector organisations in England.
Participants: Fifty-one interviewees, including senior lea-
ders in healthcare organisations (38) and policymakers
and representatives of other relevant regulatory, legal and
third-sector organisations (13).
Main outcome measures: Not applicable.
Results: Participants recognised the limitations of treating
the new policies as an exercise in procedural implementa-
tion alone and highlighted the need for additional ‘cultural
engineering’ to engender change. However, formidable
impediments included legacies of historical examples of
detriment arising from speaking up, the anxiety arising
from increased monitoring and the introduction of a legis-
lative imperative and challenges in identifying areas charac-
terised by a lack of openness and engaging with them to
improve employee voice. Beyond healthcare organisations
themselves, recent legal cases and examples of ‘blacklisting’
of whistle-blowers served to reinforce the view that giving
voice to concerns was a risky endeavour.
Conclusions: Implementation of procedural interven-
tions to support openness is challenging but feasible;
engineering cultural change is much more daunting,
given deep-rooted and pervasive assumptions about what
should be said and the consequences of mis-speaking,
together with ongoing ambivalences in the organisational
environment about the propriety of giving voice to
concerns.
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Introduction
Although the insights from the ‘front line’ or ‘sharp
end’ of organisations are an important resource for
detecting problems, learning and improvement,
organisations often struggle to encourage ‘employee
voice’ and to respond appropriately.1 This is a par-
ticular challenge in healthcare, where the importance
of speaking up about concerns has been repeatedly
demonstrated. In the United Kingdom, for example,
the first modern inquiry into National Health Service
(NHS) failings arose from concerns reported by a
nursing assistant at Ely hospital in Cardiff.2 The
NHS is far from unique in experiencing these prob-
lems: similar difficulties in eliciting and making use of
concerns of those at the sharp end of care have also
been implicated in problems of quality and safety in
health systems globally.3
Latterly, voice in the healthcare system has
become a prominent focus of government policy.4,5
In England, this attention has been driven in particu-
lar by a high-profile failings in care at Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. Led by Sir
Robert Francis QC, a public inquiry into events at
the hospital,6 and a more wide-ranging review of
Freedom to Speak Up,7 suggested that voice in health-
care organisations was inhibited by individuals’ fear
of repercussions and by perceptions of futility. In
response, the government declared its intention to
take steps to foster openness, defined in the Francis
inquiry as ‘enabling concerns to be raised and dis-
closed freely without fear, and for questions to be
answered’.6
Some of these steps have taken a procedural form.
They include initiatives such as legal protection for
‘whistle-blowers’ and revisions to guidance on report-
ing and investigating serious patient safety inci-
dents.8,9 Organisations have also been mandated to
appoint ‘Freedom to Speak Up Guardians’ (conduits
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for concerns about facilities, quality of care, or
colleagues’ behaviour) and must fund the role
themselves. An additional, distinctive feature of
policy on openness is its emphasis on the importance
of attending to the culture of the NHS as a whole, and
the extent to which it ‘actively promotes the benefits
of openness and transparency’.10 ‘Chief Executives
and Boards’, states one policy document, ‘should
promote a culture of openness’, seeking to embed
the policies by translating regulatory requirements
into cultural change.10
The academic literature supports the notion that
organisational-cultural influences have a critical
impact on voice.11–13 Research demonstrates the
importance of features of the organisational environ-
ment in encouraging or inhibiting voice, for example,
the role of psychological safety in reducing fear of
adverse consequences associated with decisions to
speak up.1,14,15 Studies have also identified the rele-
vance of heuristic schemas such as ‘implicit voice the-
ories’ about when it is appropriate to speak, which
may result in self-censorship and habituated
silence.11,12 Barriers to voice, therefore, may have
their roots more in an organisation’s cultural cues,
and in entrenched assumptions about appropriate
behaviour, than in explicit policies or the dynamics
of specific opportunities to speak. But how to realise
a policy commitment to cultural change (rather than
procedural implementation) of the kind necessary to
address these barriers remains an important challenge
and one that we address in this article? We report
findings from a recent interview-based study that
sought to examine the experiences of clinical and
managerial leaders in the English healthcare system
who were charged with implementing the policy goals
of openness.
Methods
We conducted semi-structured interviews with senior
leaders (including clinicians and administrators) in
English healthcare organisations, along with policy-
makers, representatives of regulatory bodies and indi-
viduals from relevant medico-legal and third-sector
organisations, as part of a wider mixed-methods
policy evaluation.
Senior leaders were identified through a mixture of
random, purposive and snowball sampling tech-
niques. With a view to securing representativeness,
a randomly generated selection of acute trusts (20),
community and mental healthcare trusts (10) and
ambulance trusts (5) was contacted to identify poten-
tial participants. In parallel, we purposively sampled
four organisations that had experienced problems
with openness, as indicated by regulatory
intervention and/or media coverage. Finally, we
asked participants to suggest colleagues within or
beyond their organisations who might be able to
offer insights relating to our research questions.
Wider stakeholders – such as policymakers and rep-
resentatives of regulatory, third-sector and medico-
legal organisations – were identified purposively in
consultation with a stakeholder reference group,
with snowball sampling again supplementing this ini-
tial list.
Data collection occurred between July 2017 and
January 2018. Interviews were guided by a topic guide
based on a literature review and discussion among the
authors, collaborators, the stakeholder reference group
and a patient and public involvement group. The guide
was intended to elicit participants’ in-depth understand-
ing of relevant policies, including the clarity and unity
of direction they provided, the process of implementing
them and incentives and disincentives to increase open-
ness. Interviews averaged 40min and were audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Supported by NVivo 11, we used an approach
derived from the constant-comparative method for
analysis.16 Interview transcripts were read independ-
ently by GPM and SC, who coded the data for high-
level themes derived from the evaluation brief and
academic literature, and themes identified inductively
from close reading of the data. We modified, devel-
oped and amalgamated codes as we read and re-read
data sources. Coding was accompanied by ongoing
discussion among the authors. GPM then drafted an
integrated analysis of the findings in relation to the
research questions above, which was developed and
agreed by all authors, and is presented below.
Findings
We interviewed 18 participants from acute hospitals
(denoted Ac in data excerpt attributions), 17 from
community and mental healthcare trusts (MH), and
three from ambulance trusts (Am). Participants came
from 16 acute trusts and one non-NHS provider of
acute services, 11 community and mental healthcare
trusts and three ambulance trusts: in total, 31 differ-
ent organisations were represented. We also inter-
viewed 13 wider stakeholders, bringing the total
number of interviewees to 51. NHS-employed partici-
pants largely occupied senior management positions
but also included eight Freedom to Speak Up
Guardians of varying seniority.
The challenge of encouraging voice
The need for greater openness was broadly acknowl-
edged and accepted by participants. Many cited the
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Francis inquiry as a driver for change, but some
noted that change in their organisations had started
earlier, often in response to a serious local incident.
Participants recognised that organisations were likely
to feature ‘dark spots’17 of poor performance and
practice, where lack of organisational knowledge or
reluctance to speak up obscured poor care.
My perception is that we’re probably doing a lot
better than other places, but you don’t know what
you don’t know. If staff are reluctant to come to
anybody and raise their concerns, how do you
know that? How do you benchmark it? (Ac06)
Although the aspiration for openness was welcomed,
the challenges associated with encouraging voice were
seen as daunting. Participants described fear of
speaking up as having complex origins, relating to
both perception and reality.
First, implicit voice theories12 were seen as influ-
ential. Participants described how their colleagues
associated speaking up sometimes with extreme con-
sequences, such as job loss or litigation, and some-
times with less dramatic but nonetheless important
fears, such as difficult interactions with managers or
being seen as the cause of trouble or extra work.
A closed culture was seen as the natural consequence
of such assumptions.
If people put their head above the parapet, [they fear]
that they will suffer themselves, either through being
isolated or victimized, or – worst-case scenario – that
they would suffer by losing their job, because that has
happened in places up and down the country. And
the reputation of whistleblowing is very much [that]
you’re taking a risk by doing this. (MH12)
A second reported influence on a closed culture was
the behaviours of leaders who either failed to listen or
actively suppressed voice, inducing silence through
aggression or indifference.
Sometimes you get very longstanding management
teams within a specific directorate, [and] they can
stop hearing. [. . .] And people as a consequence feel-
ing they can’t speak up: it’s not the norm.
Everything’s alright because nobody’s said anything.
(MH10)
One of my team raised a concern to the previous
chief executive, and was told not to bring a problem
to the table. He didn’t want to hear. [. . .] It has an
impact over time. (Ac11)
Finally, participants saw closed cultures as arising
when staff simply did not notice what was going
wrong. In some settings, the prevailing cultural dis-
position – that is, the taken-for-granted beliefs and
behaviours of a unit18 – was not to question. Staff did
not speak up because they did not perceive the need
to do so.
[We had issues with] a small community hospital,
completely off our radar, low level of complaints,
care of older people, people not speaking up in that
particular environment. So quite shocking to dis-
cover. (Ac04)
Such deficits of openness were seen as most likely to
occur in isolated groups, less exposed to broader
norms and inclined to be more inward-looking.
Participants reported that these groups might also
be among those most difficult to support in change
towards openness.
Promoting openness
Participants described taking seriously the goal of
promoting openness, often giving accounts of con-
certed organisational efforts to implement regulatory
requirements and of cultural work to reshape organ-
isational norms through strengthening of relation-
ships and creating a narrative of collective
accountability.
One set of tasks associated with realising openness
was largely procedural in nature. Participants
described, for example, their work to appoint
Freedom to Speak Up Guardians and prepare clear
organisational statements that explicitly encouraged
voice. Achieving these procedural tasks was not
straightforward but could at least be structured and
managed through clear operational plans.
We took the recommendations, we went through and
picked out all of those that could possibly apply to a
non-acute provider. And we grouped them in areas
that fitted into work that we were doing, and moni-
tored against them. (MH02)
Much more challenging were the cultural tasks of
reshaping organisational norms, values and behav-
iours towards openness. Many of the actions
described by participants appeared to target directly
the challenges that they saw as contributing to closed
cultures.
First, they sought to create relationships between
management and staff characterised by trust and con-
fidence. They emphasised the need for clarity and con-
sistency about the mutual obligations and expectations
of the employee–management relationship and to reas-
sure staff that punitive intent would play no role in
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responses to concerns being raised. Accordingly, they
stressed the need to ensure alignment between
espoused and enacted values by senior leaders.
There is a tentative period where people are watching
whether you are going to do what you said, and
I think having a set of values, that the leadership
doesn’t lead, is a kind of anti-value, really: it is
worse than useless. (Ac03)
In particular, they sought to convince colleagues that
giving voice to concerns was a worthwhile activity
that would deliver benefits at the sharp end, not
just in administrators’ reports to their superiors.
This meant efforts to establish openness as the
default orientation and to position conversations
about shortcomings in care as a route to collab-
orative improvement rather than hierarchical
accountability.
The most important bits around openness and trans-
parency, where the greatest success has been, [is] just
by the executive team – so me and my colleagues – out
in the patch, walking, understanding the issues, meet-
ing the staff, so we can see the problems that they’re
facing. I think that’s the biggest change. (MH08)
Second, participants sought to create a narrative of
collective accountability that both fostered a sense of
being ‘on the same side’ and emphasised shared
values. Strategies for creating and sustaining dialogue
included use of Schwartz rounds (a method by which
staff from all levels can reflect on the emotional
aspects of their roles, with a view to legitimising
and normalising openness). Participants also
described their work to take collective ownership of
problems of quality and safety, modelling openness
and embracing vulnerability rather than loading
responsibility onto the sharp end:
[Chief executive] has a blog in our intranet, and it is
completely uncensored; we don’t have any time lag
between comments to be able to censor. Some people
sail very close to the wind but nonetheless we support
free expression. [. . .] If we hear things that make us
feel uncomfortable, all good. (MH03)
Third, participants described the importance of mean-
ingful responses to concerns. In this model, problem-
solving was a key responsibility of leaders, including
closing the feedback loop by ensuring that those who
raised issues were informed of progress.
We’ve done other things; where they said, ‘This is not
right’, we’ve bought a piece of kit. So whenever we go
around, we have a little pot of money that we can
actually go into and say, ‘Well this is to help get it
sorted’. So I think people recognise that we want to
go out there and hear. (Ac01)
All in all, these efforts focused on seeking to establish
willingness to speak up as the default orientation, by
sharing the burdens and benefits of greater openness
between the blunt and sharp ends.
Frustrating a culture of openness?
Participants were cautious about the prospects for
their efforts in improving openness. Both direct
experiences and shared lore about the risks of speak-
ing up carried enduring weight and informed implicit
voice theories. Procedural interventions, they felt,
might be futile in the face of deeply rooted assump-
tions about organisational behaviour but even efforts
to intervene in organisational culture could flounder.
There are certain areas where people feel more vulner-
able than in others. And depending on previous experi-
ences, even quite historical, if there’s been a particularly
significant event and there’s been any kind of staff dis-
ciplinaries on the back of that, that legacy might still be
there in a team, sometimes many years later. (MH14)
This meant that no strategy was uniformly effective.
Participants found that their organisations were not
homogenous with respect to openness but varied
area-by-area, team-by-team. Organisations that oper-
ated across multiple sites were seen to be at particular
disadvantage in trying to inculcate a common culture
that normalised openness. Just as some parts of their
organisations had cultures that appeared more
closed, organisational units varied in their response
to efforts to breed openness.
We’re very geographically challenged, because [Town
A] and [Town B] are 45 miles apart. [. . .] To promote
speaking up in everyday practice, business as usual,
that’s going to take a long time to embed. (Ac09)
Beyond localised ‘resistance’ to efforts to foster open-
ness, a system-wide sense of vulnerability also
remained, because many of the assumptions about
the risks of speaking up still rang true. Whatever
formal policy proclaimed, and however sincere indi-
vidual organisations were in implementing it locally,
the wider system still contained conflicting signals
about the risks and benefits of openness. Widely pub-
licised criminal convictions,19 along with cases of
‘blacklisting’ of whistle-blowers, sustained the mes-
sage that openness was not risk free.
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What happened recently with the paediatrician, and
a couple of other cases of corporate manslaughter, or
individuals: [. . .] those kind of cases really risk people
being open and honest. (Wider stakeholder 10)
If you talk to staff – and I know because staff tell me
– there’s still a bit of fear about being open. So how-
ever much they’re reassured, there’s still this belief
that it may lead to being disciplined, or sanctions,
or opportunities being limited. (Am01)
Furthermore, participants reported that some aspects
of government policy perversely risked inhibiting
openness. Alongside policies to promote voice, for
example, the government had introduced a statutory
‘duty of candour’, obliging organisations and clin-
icians to acknowledge, apologise in writing for and
learn from incidences of moderate or severe harm
caused to patients.9 For those who failed to uphold
this duty, punitive consequences could follow, includ-
ing criminal prosecution.20 The legalistic language
surrounding the duty could, some participants
argued, lend further credence to the notion that open-
ness was being forced upon the healthcare service,
with a greater focus on blame than learning:
To make it a criminal offence, I think, was entirely
wrong. [. . .] Frightening people, by saying this is a
statutory duty of candour, doesn’t necessarily lead
people to being more open. (MH02)
There was also a sense that some of the accountabil-
ity requirements associated with openness risked sub-
verting the substantive intent of the policies.
Each initiative has to be counted and double-counted,
and monitored, and it is a distraction from what it’s
actually about. [. . .] The requirement for more-or-less
standard records to be kept about not only the nature
of the concern, but the characteristics of the person
raising the concern. [. . .] It’s not always appropriate to
say, ‘Are you happy with the approach that I’ve
taken?’ at that particular point. (MH05)
Overall, participants reported that the weight of the
past, alongside ongoing developments in the present,
could render their efforts at securing change fragile.
Discussion
Our findings suggest some enthusiasm for openness
initiatives among senior stakeholders across the
English NHS. However, many recognised the limita-
tions of treating the new policies as an exercise in
procedural implementation alone. They understood
that the initiatives were hard to sell to colleagues
functioning in suboptimal conditions, or who had
witnessed or heard about maltreatment of colleagues
who had spoken up about concerns in the past. When
the prevailing understanding was that speaking up
remained a ‘high risk: low benefit act’,21 new proced-
ures and the appointment of figures such as Freedom
to Speak Up Guardians were seen as unlikely to pro-
vide reassurance.
Accordingly, senior stakeholders sought to supple-
ment implementation of policies and roles with a sort
of ‘cultural engineering’ to address reticence and
assure their colleagues that giving voice to concerns
would now be welcomed, not punished. They
attempted to do this in ways that mapped well onto
existing knowledge about leadership behaviours that
empower and engage colleagues in improvement,
such as senior management visibility, connecting pro-
posed change to wider values and vision and finding
common purpose.22,23 They sought to ensure that
some of the advantages of an open culture accrued
at the sharp end and to make openness useful in
addressing everyday imperfections as well as ‘big-
ticket’ problems. Achieving this involved ongoing
dialogue between the blunt and sharp ends, focused
on understanding over accountability, with a view to
instilling openness as the default disposition.17,24
Participants argued that cultural work to engage,
and to share the benefits and burdens of openness,
was essential in underwriting any behavioural change
in relation to voice. But they also acknowledged that
this approach faced its own barriers. One was the het-
erogeneous character of their organisations: the parts
that might most benefit from efforts to improve open-
ness were often those that were difficult to identify as
problematic, difficult to reach and difficult to influ-
ence. A second was that some characteristics of the
policies risked reinforcing the view that voicing con-
cerns was a risky activity. The monitoring activity that
surrounded the Freedom to Speak Up Guardians, for
example, meant that preoccupation with the letter of
the law might undermine its spirit, converting it into a
bureaucratic display of compliance or, worse still, a
punitive threat. While policy documents stressed the
importance of ‘learning not blaming’,8 the risk was
that the very regulatory practices intended to support
it might have the opposite effect.
Thus, senior stakeholders understood that they
needed to go beyond legalistic reassurances of protec-
tion for those who spoke up, and even beyond efforts
to foster psychological safety that might embolden
staff to give voice to concerns,11 towards generating
environments where the value of openness was appar-
ent. Given the mixed signals of the wider system,
however, and the diversity of experiences and expect-
ations within organisations, our analysis suggests that
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participants may need to attend to creating an organ-
isational infrastructure that might reinforce the well-
meaning words intended to show that the blunt and
sharp ends could both benefit from greater openness.
There was little sign of the significant, programmatic
investments in structured processes for support,
development and intervention that research suggests
have underpinned changes in organisational culture
elsewhere,25–27 especially for addressing the chal-
lenges of diverse micro-cultures within healthcare
organisations.18 While efforts to lead by example
and ensure that benefits accrue at the sharp end are
surely necessary, it is perhaps doubtful whether they
are sufficient to secure sustained cultural change
around openness when messages about its risks and
rewards remain mixed.
For other systems looking to emulate the policies
and initiatives developed in the English NHS to foster
openness, our findings suggest two lessons. First,
work is required to make aspirations of openness
relevant to sharp-end clinicians working in pressured
environments, for whom compromises and work-
arounds are a taken-for-granted feature of routine
work, and who may see such interventions primarily
as blame-allocation devices.28 This means that
actions must match words, especially in environments
where initiatives purportedly intended to prompt
learning and improvement have a tendency to meta-
morphose into tools of performance management.
Second, and more broadly, the word ‘openness’ is
perhaps too passive a term to describe what is desired
here. A major barrier to openness identified by partici-
pants was not concealment or opacity among their col-
leagues but rather a kind of normalised incuriosity.
Intervening in such contexts is challenging: established
routines of explanation and rationalisation may over
time become institutionalised as legitimate ways of
dealing with problems; it is difficult to disrupt these
routines without the disruption itself being deemed
deviant.29,30 Open cultures therefore require active nur-
turing by those seeking to foster them, to imbue a state
of continued, reflexive inquiry and self-questioning.
This is not something that can be achieved by policy
implementation alone. However, it may also require
more than fine words and symbolic deeds on the part
of leaders, especially given the shadow of history and
the equivocal signals of the present.
Our study has limitations. Participants self-
selected in their response to requests for interview.
It is plausible that they represented organisations
that were more forward-thinking in their approach
to fostering openness; indeed, wider stakeholder par-
ticipants affirmed that some organisations were less
advanced in implementing openness policies. Despite
our partly random sampling strategy, therefore, it
should not be assumed that our findings are nation-
ally representative. Furthermore, we have only inter-
view accounts of participants’ views and of their
organisations and colleagues’ behaviour, and we
have no measure of the impact of the approaches
they saw as more or less successful.
Conclusion
Calls to improve employee voice pose challenges for
senior stakeholders. While implementation of proced-
ure is possible, engineering cultural change is daunting,
given deep-rooted and pervasive assumptions about
what should be said and the consequences of mis-
speaking, together with ongoing ambivalences in the
organisational environment about the propriety of
giving voice to concerns. Visible efforts to reframe
the relationship between blunt and sharp ends of
organisations seem a promising approach, but it is
not clear that such endeavours will succeed in the
absence of an infrastructure that underwrites positive
words with consistent organisational action.
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